Articles and Resources

Books: The following books are relevant to the materials covered in this course.

1. “Social and Economic Networks“, by Matthew O. Jackson. Princeton University Press.
2. “Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World”, By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. The book is available online [full book] [individual chapters]. See also the references to the literature in this book.
3. “Auction Theory”, Vijay Krishna. Academic Press. 1st Edition (2002) or 2nd edition (2010).
4. Milgrom, P: Putting auction theory to work, Cambridge University Press 2004.
5. “Algorithmic Game Theory”, the book is intended for computer scientists, but some chapters are accessible to non-computer scientists.  The entire book online by clicking here (username=agt1user, password=camb2agt).
6. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Paul Klemperer. Princeton University Press. Online version.

Surveys:

• Roth, Alvin E. “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation as Tools of Design Economics,” Econometrica, 70, 4, July 2002, 1341-1378.
• Matching, Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources, T. Sönmez, U. Ünver in Handbook of Social Economics, 2008.
• “An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications,” July 2009, forthcoming in the The Handbook of Social Economics, edited by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M.O. Jackson, Elsevier Press.
• Auction Theory: A guide to the literature.  Paul Klemperer (1999).  An update.
• Auctions and Bidding. By McAfee and McMillan. (1987)
• 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics [overview.pdf][details.pdf]
• Wolfers, Justin, & Eric Zitzewitz. Prediction Markets
• Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu. 2004. “Economic Insights from Internet Auctions.” Journal of Economic Literature, 42, 457-486.
• Reputation Mechanisms , Chrysanthos Dellarocas, http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/cdell/papers/elsevierchapter.pdf

You can choose a paper for your seminar work from the following list; You can also choose other relevant academic papers. Anyway, you need to get my (Liad) approval for your selection.

Articles:

• Auctions:

1. Hal Varian “Position Auctions” [PDF]. International Journal of Industrial Organization.25(6),  2007. 1163-1178
2. (TAKEN) Michael Ostrovsky, Benjamin Edelman and Michael Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords“  American Economic Review, v. 97(1), March 2007, pp. 242-259.
3. Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, and Paul Milgrom. “Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions“.  2009.
4. Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information. Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg V. Baranov. [pdf]
5. (TAKEN) Ilya Segal amd Przemyslaw Jeziorski “What Makes them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Internet Search Advertising” . 2009.
6. (TAKEN) Jennifer Brown and John Morgan, “How much is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites“.
7. (TAKEN) Jennifer Brown, Tanjim Hossain and John Morgan  “Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression:Evidence from the Field”.
8. (TAKEN) Chu, Chenghuan Sean; Leslie, Phillip; and Sorensen, Alan T.: Bundle-Size Pricing as an Approximation to Mixed Bundling
9. “Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis,” with Yuanchuan Lien and John Kagel, Revised April 11, 2009. [Data files, Instructions]
10. (TAKEN) “Skewed Bidding in Pay Per Action Auctions for Online Advertising“, Susan Athey, Nikhil Agarwal, David Yang. To appear, American Economic Review
11. “Position Auctions with Consumer Search“, Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison.
12. (TAKEN) Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Elena Katok, Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions,Management Science, 54(4), April 2008, pp. 808-819.
13. “Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study” (Jacon K. Goeree and T. Offerman) American Economic Review, 92(3), June 2002, 625-643.
14. (TAKEN) Ockenfels, Axel and Alvin E. Roth, “Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction,” Games and Economic Behavior, 55, 2006, 297-320
15. (TAKEN) Roth, Alvin E. and Axel Ockenfels. 2002. “Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet.” American Economic Review,92(4), 1093-1103.
16. Katok, Elena, and Alvin E. Roth, “Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative ‘Dutch’ Auctions,” Management Science, 50, 8, August 2004, 1044-1063.
17. Common­Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz‐Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking.
18. (TAKEN) Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton, and Paul Milgrom. 2006. “The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design,” in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 5, MIT Press, 2006.
19. Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence. Tilman Borgers, Ingemar Cox, Martin Pesendorfer and Vaclav Petricek.
20. (TAKEN) Ariely, Dan, Axel Ockenfels, and Alvin E. Roth. 2005. “An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions.” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(4), 891-908.
21. Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu. 2003. “The Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions.” RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2), 329-355
22. (TAKEN) Levin, Jonathan and Paul Milgrom: “Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design,” American Economic Review P&P, 2010.
23. Ghosh, Arpita, Preston McAfee, Kishore Papineni, and Sergei Vassilvitskii, 2009, Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising, working paper.
24. McAfee, P. and J. McMillan (1992),  Bidding Rings , American Economic Review, 82: 579-599
25. (TAKEN) Asker. J. and E. Cantillon (2008), Properties of Scoring Auctions, forthcoming in  Rand Journal of Economics
26. Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions. Jakub Kastl. orthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies
27. Levin, D. and J. Smith (1994), Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry. American Economic Review, 84: 585-599.
28. (TAKEN) Binmore, Ken and Paul Klemperer, “The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of  the British 3G Telecom Licenses,” Economic Journal, 2002.

• Social networks

You may choose to present chapters from the book “Social and Economic Networks”, By Matt Jackson. (Copies available at the library.) Please choose a chapter (or some sub-section for large chapters) and ask for Liad’s approval.

1. Stephen Morris, ”Contagion“, Review of Economic Studies (2000) 67, 57-78
2. (Taken) Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks
   Stephen Leider, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat, and Quoc-Anh Do
3. “An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation,” Sergio Currarini, Matthew O. Jackson and Paolo Pin, in Econometrica Vol. 77, No. 4, 1003–1045, July 2009.
4. Self-Correcting Information Cascades” (with R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, and B. Rogers) Review of Economic Studies, 74(3), July 2007, 733-762.

• Reputation and recommendation:

1. (TAKEN) P. Resnick, R. Zeckhauser, J. Swanson, and K. Lockwood. The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment. Experimental Economics. 9(2) pp. 79-101, 2006
2. N. Miller, P. Resnick, and R. Zeckhauser. Eliciting Honest Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method. Management Science, 51(9): 1359-1373, 2005.
3. (TAKEN) Gary E Bolton, Elena Katok and Axel Ockenfels How effective are online reputation mechanisms? An experimental study, Management Science 50(11) November 2004, pp. 1587-1602.
4. (TAKEN) Bolton, Claudia Loebbecke and Axel Ockenfels, How social reputation networks interact with competition in online trading: An experimental study, Journal of Management Information Systems, forthcoming
5. (TAKEN) Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., Ockenfels, A.  Trust among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics Approach, Analyse und Kritik, 26(2), 185-202.

• Other:

1. (TAKEN) Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver, “Kidney Exchange,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 2, May, 2004, 457-488
2. (TAKEN) Sequential Kidney Exchange. Lawrence M. Ausubel and Thayer Morrill. [pdf]
3. (PDF). “ Designing Incentives for Online Question and Answer Forums by Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, and David C. Parkes. In the 10th ACM Electronic Commerce Conference (EC’09), pages 129-138, 2009.
4. (TAKEN) (PDF)  An Options-Based Solution to the Sequential Auction Problem.by Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes. In Artificial Intelligence 173, 2009, pages 876-899
5. (TAKEN) Prediction Without Markets.  Sharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, Duncan J. Watts, David M. Pennock.
6. Optimizing Scrip Systems, Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, and Joseph Y. Halpern
7. (TAKEN) Athey, Susan and Joshua Gans, 2010.� �The Impact of Targeting Technology on Advertising Markets and Media Competition.�� American Economic Review, forthcoming.
8. (TAKEN) Ausubel, Lawrence and Peter Cramton, “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” working paper, 2008.